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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, 
v. 
JOSEPH P. TUNZI, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20010676-SC 
Ct. App. No. 20000728-CA 
Priority No. 13 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' ruling that a district 
court loses jurisdiction over a serious youth offender who pleads guilty to a lesser, non-
serious youth offense. See State v. Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, 31 P.3d 588 (addendum A). 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does the district court lose jurisdiction over a serious youth offender who pleads 
guilty to a lesser, non-serious youth offense arising out of the same criminal episode? 
On a writ of certiorari, this Court will "review the court of appeals' decision for 
correctness and gives its conclusions of law no deference." Newspaper Agency Corp. v 
Auditing Div., 938 P.2d 266,267 (Utah 1997). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness. See State v. Maestas, 2000 UT App 22, If 11, 997 P.2d 3 14 (citing 
State v. Fixei 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997)), cert, denied, 4 P.3d 1289 (Utah 2000) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RILES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of the following statutes, reproduced 
in context in addenda B and C: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(7) (1996). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against 
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds 
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the 
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the 
district court to answer for those charges. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996) (superseded by S.B- 26) (emphasis added). 
(10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
S.B. 26, adding a new section 10 to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602, and renumbering and 
amending existing section 10 (emphasis added). 
(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed 
or any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(11) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the district court. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, a juvenile, was bound over to district court under the Serious Youth 
Offender Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996), to stand trial for attempted homicide. 
R. 9-12. At trial, the State requested and received a lesser included offense instruction for 
aggravated assault. R. 73-74, 98. The lesser included offense instruction permitted the jury 
to convict defendant of second degree felony aggravated assault if it found that defendant 
intentionally caused serious bodily injury, or of third degree felony aggravated assault if it 
found that defendant used a dangerous weapon or force likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury. R. 96. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). 
The jury acquitted defendant of attempted homicide, but convicted him of aggravated 
assault. R. 108-09. However, because the verdict form did not differentiate between second 
degree ("causes serious bodily injury") or third degree felony ("uses a dangerous weapon") 
aggravated assault, the State agreed that the conviction should be entered only for a third 
degree felony. R. 108, 118-19; R. 222:4. 
Defendant then moved to remand his case to the juvenile court on the theory that 
because he was convicted only of a third degree felony and not of an offense enumerated in 
the Serious Youth Offender Act, the district court lost jurisdiction over his case. R. 222:5-
11. The district court denied the motion. R. 222:11. 
Defendant timely appealed to the court of appeals. R. 122. After discovering that the 
videotape for the second day of trial was missing, defendant moved for summary reversal on 
the ground that he could not obtain adequate appellate review without a complete trial 
transcript. The State stipulated to the reversal. The court of appeals ordered a temporary 
remand to the trial court afor preparation and approval of *a statement of evidence or 
proceedings.'" R. 143. On certiorari review, this Court summanly reversed and remanded 
for a new trial. R. 150-51. 
On remand, the information was amended pursuant to a plea bargain to charge third 
degree felony aggravated assault, to which defendant pled guilty. R. 202-10, 223:2-S. 
Defendant did not renew his motion to remand his case to the juvenile court or otherwise 
suggest that the district court had been divested of jurisdiction. See R. 223:2-10. Pursuant 
to the plea agreement, the district court sentenced defendant to zero to five years in prison, 
gave him credit for time served (approximately twenty-one months), and suspended the 
remainder of the sentence. R. 202-03; R. 223: 10. Defendant was released without probation 
and his case was closed. R. 223:8-10. 
Defendant appealed, claiming that the district court erred in not sua sponte remanding 
the case back to the juvenile court. R. 211. The court of appeals agreed and "vacate[d] the 
district court's judgment of conviction and remand[ed] to the district court w ith instructions 
to transfer the case to juvenile court for entry of an adjudication of guilty for third degree 
felony aggravated assault." Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224,1} I. 
This Court granted the State's petition for certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his plea affidavit, defendant avers that he assaulted John Vigil "with a dangerous 
weapon likely to cause death or serious bodily injury to wit: a knife/' R. 205. At the change 
of plea heanng, defendant affirmed his counsel's representation that "he got in a fight with 
John Vigil and during that fight, he had a knife in his possession and used the knife," 
resulting in an injury to Vigil's throat. R. 223: 5. 
The treating physician testified that the knife sliced through Vigil's trachea "to the 
esophagus and vertebral column." R. 141: 185. The nerve to Vigil's vocal cord was 
irreparably severed, with the result that the vocal cord was permanently paralyzed so that 
"it's difficult for the other vocal cord to totally close, to protect the airway or to have normal 
speech." Id. at 184. But for the emergency insertion of an endotracheal or breathing tube, 
defendant's attack would have resulted in Vigil's death. R. 141: 179-82. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in ruling that the district court loses jurisdiction over a 
serious youth offender who pleads guilty to a crime that arises out of the same criminal 
episode but is not itself a serious youth offense. 
The court read the language of the Senous Youth Offender statute too narrowly. 
Under that statute, jurisdiction reverts to the juvenile court only if there is "an acquittal, a 
finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in district court." The most reasonable 
reading of this section would recognize that there is no dismissal of "the charges" in district 
:> 
court w hile any charge arising out of the original criminal episode is pending. This reading 
permits the district court to retain the criminal prosecution to its conclusion, whether by 
conviction on the charged offense, conviction on a lesser offense arising out of the same 
conduct, dismissal, or acquittal. 
In contrast, the court of appeals' opinion mandates an unworkable procedure. In an 
appropriate case, it would require a district court to instruct the jury on a charge over which 
it lacked jurisdiction and to receive a verdict on that charge; it would require the juvenile 
court to determine whether newly discovered evidence would have altered the outcome of 
a case it did not try; and it would require a judge who did not preside over the case to impose 
sentence. It is unsurprising that every state whose courts have considered the question has 
ultimately rejected this approach. 
Finally, recent amendments to the Serious Youth Offender statute overrule the court 
of appeals' decision. This legislation states in part, "If a minor enters a plea to, or is found 
guilty of, any of the charges filed or any other offense arising from the same criminal 
episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including 
sentencing/' Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602( 10) (as amended by S.B. 26 2002). 
These clarifying amendments, adopted unanimously by the Legislature, dispose of the 
case at bar. An amendment that merely clarifies how the law should have been understood 
originally will be applied retroactively, especially where, as here, the clarifying amendment 
is to a procedural statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT RETAINS JURISDICTION OVER A 
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER WHO PLEADS GUILTY TO A 
LESSER, NON-SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENSE ARISING OUT OF THE 
SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE 
Defendant, having been charged with one of nine enumerated violent felonies, was 
bound over to the district court under the Serious Youth Offender Act. The Serious Youth 
Offender Act serves the 'legitimate purpose" of protecting the public from ''juveniles who 
are just as dangerous as adult criminals." In reA.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied, Minor v. State, 945 P.2d 1118 (Utah 1997). Under the Act, a prosecuting agency 
charging a juvenile 16 or 17 years of age with any of nine enumerated felonies must proceed 
by filing a criminal information in the juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a- 602( 1) 
(1996). The juvenile court holds a preliminary hearing at which the State bears the burden 
of establishing probable cause to believe that an enumerated crime has been committed and 
that the juvenile committed it. § 78-3a-602(3)(a). If probable cause is established, the 
juvenile court wwshall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district 
court in the same manner as an adult" unless the juvenile can establish three retention factors 
by clear and convincing evidence. § 78-3a-602(3)(b). 
Under subsection (7) of the Act, a juvenile bound over on a serious youth offense may 
also be bound over to the district court to answer for "other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him . . ." 
/ 
Finally, subsection (10) of the Act provides that the juvenile court will "regain 
junsdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there is an 
acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district court." § 78-3a-
602( 10). This subsection lies at the heart of this case. If there was "dismissal of the charges 
in district court/'jurisdiction reverted to the juvenile court; if there was not, the district court 
properly retained jurisdiction. 
A. There was not a "dismissal of the charges in district court" because 
defendant pled guilty to a crime arising out of the criminal episode 
on which he was bound over. 
The term "the charges" as used in subsection (10) is most reasonably read to include 
any charges, including lesser included offenses, arising out of the conduct that qualified the 
juvenile as a serious youth offender. Under this reading, the juvenile court would not regain 
jurisdiction unless and until all charges arising out of the original criminal episode were 
disposed of. This reading permits the district court to see the case through to its conclusion, 
whether by conviction on the charged offense, conviction on a lesser offense arising out o( 
the same conduct, dismissal, or acquittal. This result is consistent with the "strong 
presumption of district court jurisdiction." A.B., 936 P.2d at 1095. 
The court of appeals erroneously interpreted %4the charges" narrowly to refer only to 
the senous youth offense and other charges expressly bound over by the juvenile court. It 
reasoned that "the juvenile court regained junsdiction over Tunzi because there was \\ 
finding of not guilty [and] dismissal of the charges [enumerated in section 78-3a-602( 1) and 
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allowing bind-over to] district court/ L'tah Code Ann. § 78-3a-6G2(lO) (1996)." 
Tunzu 2001 UT App 224, f 13 (bracketed material in original). 
This analysis is unsatisfactory because it resolves the central statutory ambiguit} 
merely by inserting its own bracketed language limiting "the charges" to serious youth 
offenses on which the juvenile was bound over. Moreover, the insertion is unwarranted 
because, had the Legislature intended this result, it would have referred to "the enumerated 
charges'' or, as in the direct file statute, "the qualifying charge": "If the qualifying charge 
under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the 
charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of 
Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor." 
§ 78-3a-601(3)(b) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).1 
In its next paragraph, the court's opinion notes that the term "the charges" also 
includes non-serious youth offenses specifically bound over by the juvenile court. 
Subsection (7) permits the juvenile court to bind a juvenile over on "other offenses arising 
from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him . . ." § 78-3a-602(7). Because the juvenile court did not bind defendant over 
on third degree felony aggravated assault, the court reasoned, that charge was not an "other 
But even in the direct file context, "The district court is not divested of jurisdiction 
by virtue of the fact that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser 
or joined offense." § 78-3a-60l(2) (Supp. 2001). 
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offense" under subsection (7) and so could not be included in subsection (10)'s reference to 
"the charges." Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224,«f 16. 
The court of appeals warned that permitting the district court to retain junsdiction 
over a juvenile after dismissal of the serious youth offense on which he was bound over 
would contravene "the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act." Id. ^ [18. "Specificallv, it would 
be unjust and contrary to a minor's best interests to require a minor to 'answer in district 
court in the same manner as an adult' when the minor has not been convicted of any of the 
violent felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth Offender Act." Id. (quoting A.B., 936 P.2d 
at 1098). 
Yet in attempting to avoid this supposed injustice, the court of appeals' approach 
would lead to an irrational result. If the day after slicing open John Vigil's neck defendant 
had urinated in public, the juvenile court could have bound him over to district court on a 
class C misdemeanor charge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702(7) (1996). When the 
attempted murder charge was amended down to aggravated assault pursuant to a plea 
bargain, the district court would lose junsdiction over the aggravated assault, but retain 
junsdiction over the public urination charge. Thus, although the juvenile had "not been 
convicted of any of the violent felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth Offender Act" he 
would be nevertheless be required to "answer in distnct court in the same manner as an 
adult"—for the unrelated misdemeanor charge, but not for the very conduct that earned him 
senous youth offender status. Tunzi, 2001 I T App 224, «| 18. 
to 
This Court should avoid such an absurd result by reading "the charges'* in subsection 
(10) to include all charges arising out of the original criminal episode. See Aha Indus. Ltd. 
v. Hurst
 t 846 P.2d 1282, 1292 n.24 (Utah 1993) (stating that ''statutes are interpreted to avoid 
absurd results^ (citation omitted)). 
B. The court of appeals' aberrational approach would create an 
unworkable system rejected by every jurisdiction to consider it. 
Under the court of appeals' reading of the Serious Youth Offender statute, once a 
defendant is acquitted of the enumerated felony, or that charge is dismissed pursuant to plea 
bargain, the proper course is "to transfer the case to the juvenile court for entry of an 
adjudication of guilt" on the lesser included offense to which defendant pled guilty. Tunzi 
at ^ 19. This approach would eliminate most lesser included offense instructions in serious 
youth offender cases, would create an unworkable procedure never contemplated by the 
Legislature, and has—unsurprisingly—been rejected by every state whose courts have 
considered it. 
The procedure created by the court of appeals effectively eliminates lesser included 
instructions in serious youth cases. If, as will almost always be the case, the lesser included 
offense was not an enumerated serious youth offense, the district court would lack subject 
matter jurisdiction to try it. This gap in the district court's jurisdiction would, for example, 
force the jury to choose between the charged offense and acquittal even where the evidence 
would support conviction on a lesser included offense. State v. Morales, 694 A.2d 758, "62 
(Conn. 1997). 
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This danger is not merely hypothetical, but has occurred. A 15-vear-old named Murch 
was tried under a statutory scheme providing that a juvenile under sixteen could not be found 
guilty of a crime, except one punishable by death or life imprisonment. See People v. 
Murch, 189 N.E. 220, 221 (N.Y. 1934). At Murchfs trial for first degree murder, the trial 
court refused to instruct on the lesser included charge of manslaughter. Id. at 221. The New 
York high court held that the trial court properly refused the lesser included offense 
instruction, since a 'Verdict of manslaughter or of juvenile delinquency would have been a 
nullity. . ." Id. at 222. 
If a district court did instruct on a lesser included offense over which it lacked 
jurisdiction, other anomalies could follow. As soon as the jury acquitted of the serious youth 
offense, the district court would lose jurisdiction. See Tunzi, 2001 UT App 224, f^ 19. Would 
the district court retain jurisdiction to receive the jury's verdict on the lesser included 
offense? If so, and if the jury convicted on that charge, the district court would presumably 
be required to transfer the matter back to the juvenile court in medias res. See Id. at 1 19. 
If the juvenile then filed a motion for new trial, the juvenile court would be left to determine 
whether "newly discovered evidence would possibly change the outcome in a case it did not 
try." Id. atf 24, n.l (Orme, J., concurring). Finally, the juvenile judge would be required 
to determine the appropriate sentence even though did not preside over the case. Id. at ^ 24, 
n. 2. 
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The Legislature is unlikely to have intended such an unwieldy procedure "without 
saying a little bit more about how such an aberrational approach to criminal jurisprudence 
would work in practice/' Id. at K 24 (Orme, J., concurring). 
Unsurprisingly, the approach adopted by the court of appeals has been ultimately 
rejected by every state whose courts have considered it. See, e.g., Walker v. State, 827 
S.W,2d 637,640-41 (Ark. 1992) (adult court did not lose jurisdiction when juvenile charged 
with murder, an enumerated offense, was convicted of manslaughter, a non-enumerated 
offense on which juvenile could not have been transferred to adult court); People v. 
Davenport, 602 P.2d 871, 872 (Colo. App. 1979) ("Once an indictment charging a class 1 
felony is filed, the jurisdiction of the district court is expressly fixed . . . and that jurisdiction 
is not lost simply because the juvenile defendant is convicted of a lesser offense"); Morales, 
694 A.2d at 763 ("When a juvenile, after receiving all legislative safeguards, is transferred 
to the regular criminal docket and prosecuted for murder, the statute places him in the same 
position as an adult... [including] the possibility of conviction of appropriate lesser included 
offenses"); State v. Walgamotte, 415 So.2d 205, 207 n.4 (La.) (recognizing that the 
legislature amended the juvenile code "to provide for the district court's retainingjunsdiction 
over a juvenile defendant who, when charged with the greater crime which confers district 
court jurisdiction, pleads guilty to a lesser included offense"), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 970 
(1982); Gray v. State, 253 A.2d 395,399 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) (adult court did not lose 
jurisdiction over juvenile by the jury's return of a verdict of manslaughter, a lesser included 
13 
offense), cert, denied, 256 Md. 745 (Md. 1969); Commonwealth v. Williams, 091 YE.2d 
553, 556 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting juvenile's claim that adult court could impose no sentence 
on lesser included offense without first remanding the case to juvenile court for transfer 
heanng or juvenile commitment); People v. Parrish, 549 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Mich. App. 1996) 
("once the circuit court acquires junsdiction to try the juvenile as an adult under the 
automatic waiver statute, it does not lose jurisdiction to sentence the defendant if he pleads 
guilty of a nonenumerated offense"); Williams v. State, 459 So.2d 777, 779 (Miss. 1984) 
("once junsdiction is acquired, it is not lost by accepting a plea to a lesser-included offense 
or conviction for a lesser-included offense, even though such offenses would not originally 
confer jurisdiction in the circuit court"); Dicus v. Second Judicial Dist. Ct., 625 P.2d 1175, 
1177 (Nev. 1981) ("when the adult court acquires junsdiction in a prosecution of an offense 
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, junsdiction is maintained to convict of the charged 
cnme and its lesser included offenses"); Mason v. State, 868 P.2d 724, 727 (Okla. Ct. Cnm. 
App. 1994) ("Once jurisdiction over the juvenile is properly acquired, the district court may 
convict and sentence him or her for any lesser included offense"). 
C. Recent legislation, adopted unanimously by both House and Senate, 
overrules the court of appeals' decision and applies on this appeal. 
Any doubt about the Legislature's intent was recently removed. In his concumng 
opinion, Judge Ormepresciently wrote/1 recognize there is about a fifty percent chance we 
are wrong. If we are, with the problem having been highlighted by this case, I am confident 
the Legislature will speedily rectify our mistake." Tunzi, 2001 I T App 224,fl 25 (Orme, J , 
14 
concumng). In its current session, the Legislature has amended the Serious Youth Offender 
statute to make clear its original intent. 
Senate Bill 26 adds a new subsection (10) and changes "the charges" to "all charges" 
in existing subsection (10), which it renumbers subsection (11): 
(10) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed 
or any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court 
retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(11) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all 
charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) & (11) (as amended by S.B. 26 2002). 
These amendments are in effect. The act provides that "if approved by two-thirds of 
all the members elected to each house, this act takes effect upon approval by the Governor 
. . ." S.B. 26, § 4. The legislation passed the Senate on a vote of 29 to 0 and the House on 
a vote of 69 to 0. See http://www.le.state.ut.us/-2002/status/sbillsta/sb0026.htm (visited 1 
March 2002). The enrolled copy of the bill was signed by the Governor on 27 February 2002 
(addendum C). It is now in effect. 
Under these amendments, the district court had jurisdiction to sentence defendant on 
the aggravated assault charge. Defendant pled guilty to an "offense arising from the same 
criminal episode" as that giving rise to the Serious Youth Offender charge; therefore, under 
the amendment, "the district court retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, 
including sentencing." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602( 10) & (11) (as amended by S.B. 26 
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2002). To ensure no misunderstanding, the Legislature also specified that the ju\ enile court 
would not regain jurisdiction over the juvenile until "dismissal of all charges in the district 
court." Id. (emphasis added). Since "all charges" were not dismissed here, the juvenile court 
did not regain jurisdiction. Thus, if these amendments apply to the instant case, the court of 
appeals must be reversed. 
The amendments apply to the instant case. Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 states the 
general rule: "No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared." 
See also Keegan v. State, 896 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1995) ("statutes are not to be applied 
retroactively unless expressly so declared by the legislature"). However, this principle "has 
no application where the later statute or amendment deals only with clarification or 
amplification as to how the law should have been understood prior to its enactment." Foil 
v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979) (quoting Okland Constr. Co. v. Indus. 
Comm 'n, 520 P.2d 208,210-11 (Utah 1974) (footnote omitted)); accord Evans & Sutherland, 
953 P.2d at 440. "This exception applies with particular force when, as here, the clarifying 
amendment is to a procedural statute." Id. Otherwise stated, "Remedial and procedural 
amendments apply to accrued, pending, and future actions." State v. Daniels. 2002 LT 2. ^ 
40, 438 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (quoting State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986)) (describing this rule 
as a "long-standing exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity"). 
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As a remedial or clarifying amendment to a procedural statute. Senate Bill 26 applies 
to this pending action. The bill's preface announces its purpose of "clarifying when 
jurisdiction over a minor is retained under the Serious Youth Offender provisions." S.B. 26. 
Statements of the bill's sponsor reinforce this intent. 
Floor debates, including statements by a bill's sponsor, are at best an uncertain guide 
to statutory construction. See 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 
48.13 at 466 (6th ed. 2000 Revision). 'The traditional view ruled out consideration of 
legislative debates under any circumstance/' Id. at 469. Cf. State v. Kenison, 2000 UT App 
322 1|10, 14 P.3d 129 (declining to consider floor debates in construing statute); Alpine 
School Dist. Bd. ofEduc. v. State Tax Comm *n, 2000 UT App 319,1j 11, 14 P.3d 125 (same). 
But see Coleman v. Thomas, 2000 UT 53, ^ 18 n.4, 4 P.3d 783 (quoting, but not relying on, 
floor debate); Lopez v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 932 P.2d 601, 604 n.3 (Utah 1997) 
(citing floor debate); Stouffer Food Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n, 970 P.2d 272, 276 (Utah App. 
1998) (stating that review of Senate discussion "provides insight into the statute's purpose"). 
Nevertheless, a sponsor's "remarks upon presenting the bill to the house and his 
answers to questions asked by members will be considered by the courts in construing 
provisions of the bill subsequently enacted into law." 2 A Sutherland § 48.14 at 473-74; $ 
48.15 at 475-76. Accord Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) (noting that 
statements by a bill's sponsor are not controlling, but provide "evidence" of legislative intent 
"when they are consistent with the statutory language and other legislative history"). In Foil 
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v. Balinger, this Court, in determining that a statutory amendment was intended to o\ errule 
a judicial decision, found the sponsor's remarks while presenting the bill to the legislature 
^illuminating as to its purpose/' 601 P.2d at 150 (holding the amendment retroactive). 
Here, Senator Hillyard, presenting S.B. 26 to the Senate, described it as letting the 
court of appeals2 know they had misunderstood the Serious Youth Offender statute in Tunzr. 
Now it's interesting to read the decision of the court because what they did, 
they sent him back to juvenile court and they said, "We don't know the 
answer, but we're sure if we're wrong the legislature will tell us/' Well 
we're here to tell them that they were wrong. We made the decision when 
we did the Serious Youth Offender that if someone does something that 
serious, they've had that kind of background and that kind of help, the 
decision we made is that the rehabilitative thrust of juvenile court should 
no longer be available to them. They ought to move into the adult system 
with the emphasis on public safety. So what this bill says is, if that happens 
again, because we've made the decision to move them over to the adult system, 
they'll stay in the adult system and be treated for the conviction of the 
misdemeanor as though they had been an adult and convicted of the same 
misdemeanor and treated there. That's what the bill does. It was approved 
unanimously by the interim committee. Again I think it answers a question the 
Supreme Court asked us the answer. I think we're just keeping in policy 
what we've decided before. 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, presentation of S.B. 26 to the Utah 
Senate, 22 January 2002, Day 2, Tape 4 (transcribed by Lee Nakamura, secretary, Utah 
Attorney General's Office) (emphasis added) (addendum D). 
On the House floor, Rep. Swallow described S.B. 26's effect as follows: "This bill 
clarifies that if they are charged with that adult cnme and convicted of a lesser cnme that 
district court still retains jurisdiction over the juvenile and that avoids the conflict between 
2
 Sen. Hillyard misidentified the court of appeals as the Utah Supreme Court. 
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jurisdiction/' Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, presentation of S.B. 20 
to the Utah House of Representatives, 30 January 2002, Day 10, Tape 1 (transcribed by Lee 
Nakamura, secretary, Utah Attorney General's Office) (emphasis added) (addendum D). 
When the bill returned to the Senate, Sen. Hillyard again described it: 
Youth Corrections came to me and said could you please get this effective 
immediately because of the problems we're having with some of the cases of 
being referred back at district court. We are reversing a Utah court case that 
said ''we don't know what the answer is but we're going to guess and if we're 
wrong the legislature will correct us." So we said, "you guessed wrong, we're 
correcting you." 
Recording of the Proceedings of the 54th Legislature, presentation of S.B. 26 to the Utah 
Senate, 1 February 2002, Day 12, Tape 19 (transcribed by Lee Nakamura, secretary, Utah 
Attorney General's Office) (addendum D). 
Thus, as remedial legislation that merely clarifies existing law, S.B. 26 is entitled to 
retroactive effect. This is doubly so because it "changes only procedural law by providing 
a different mode or form of procedure for enforcing substantive rights without enlarging or 
eliminating vested rights." Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 437-38. A change in subject 
matter jurisdiction is procedural, not substantive. In Evans & Sutherland, this Court 
considered the effect of the passage of section 59-1-601, which provided that "the district 
court shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all decisions by the [tax] commission 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings." Evans & Sutherland, 953 P.2d at 438 
(quoting § 59-1-601). Previously, "the district court did not have jurisdiction to review 
Commission decisions resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings," which were appealed 
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directly to the supreme court. Id. This Court concluded that the amendment, which "clearK 
delineate[d] the district court's jurisdiction/* was "procedural in nature . . . The substantive 
law pertinent to this dispute has not been changed; instead, section 59-1-601 merely affects 
the judicial machinery available for determining the substantive rights." Id. at 438,440. The 
new legislation therefore applied to a claim arising prior to its passage. Id. at 436, 440. 
Applying the recent amendments in the case at bar would eliminate no "vested rights/" 
"A juvenile has no right to treatment in the juvenile system or to be specially treated as a 
juvenile delinquent instead of a cnminal offender." State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah 
1989) (Hall, C.J., with one justice concurring and one justice concurring in result) (footnotes 
and internal quotations omitted). Accord State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1005 (Utah 1995) 
("Because they have no 'right' to juvenile treatment, defendants cannot claim that their 
juvenile status was unconstitutionally removed by the legislature."). 
Because the amendment at issue here, like the amendment at issue in Evans & 
Sutherland, merely "delineates the district court's jurisdiction/' it is "procedural in nature/' 
and thus entitled to retroactive application. Id. at 438, 440. 
* * * 
In sum, the court of appeals gave the Serious Youth Offender statute an unduly narrow 
reading, thereby creating an unworkable procedure never intended by the Legislature. The 
Legislature unanimously clarified its original intent m an amendment which applies in and 
disposes of the instant case. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals and affirm defendant's district court 
conviction. 
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ADDENDUM A 
31 P 3d 5 ^ 
426 Ltah \d\ Rep 13. 2^01 LT App 224 
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 588) 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Joseph TUNZL Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20000728-CA. 
July 19,2001. 
Juvenile bound over to be tried as an adult for 
attempted murder was acquitted of attempted murder 
but convicted of aggravated assault in the District 
Court, Salt Lake Department, Judith S Atherton, J 
Defendant's motion to remand his case to juvenile 
court was denied and the District Court entered a 
conviction for third degree felony aggravated assault. 
Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals. Davis, J . 
held that once juvenile was acquitted of the core 
crime that led to his bind-over, jurisdiction reverted 
to the juvenile court. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Orme, J., concurred and filed opinion. 
West Headnotes 
(1] Criminal Law <®=>1134(3) 
HOkl 134(3) Most Cited Cases 
Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed for 
correctness and no deference is given to the 
conclusions of the trial court. 
[2| Infants <$=»68.5 
211k68 5 Most Cited Cases 
Any jurisdictional defect arising from the 
misapplication of the Serious Youth Offender Act. 
which defines the jurisdictional limits of both the 
juvenile court and the district court when a juvenile is 
charged with certain offenses, cannot be waived 
U C A. 1953, §§ 78-3a-60t to 78-3a-603. 
[3| Criminal Law <£=>273.4(1) 
Ii0k273 4(l) Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's plea of guilty in district court to crime 
committed when he was a juvenile did not waive 
defendant's claim of error that district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction. 
Copr c West 2002 No Clai 
Paoe 2 
[4) Infants <£=>68.6 
2 lik68 6 Most Cited Cases 
Juvenile court regained jurisdiction over juvenile 
bound over for trial on attempted murder charge 
when juvenile was acquitted of attempted murder and 
found guilty of what was ultimately determined to be 
third degree felony aggravated assault, though second 
degree felony aggravated assault was an otfense 
allowing bind-over of a juvenile, as court in effect 
dismissed that charge when it entered conviction for 
third degree felony aggravated assault as remedy for 
ambiguous verdict. Lr C A. 1953. § "S-3-602( 1. 10) 
[5| Infants <£=>68.5 
21lk68 5 Most Cited Cases 
When juvenile charged with attempted murder was 
found guilty of third degree felonv aggravated assault, 
district court lacked jurisdiction to enter conviction 
therefore, though the assault arose out of the same 
criminal episode and involved the same victim, since 
information charged only single offense of attempted 
murder and juvenile court's bind-over did not 
necessarily include finding of probable cause to 
believe that juvenile committed third degree felonv 
aggravated assault. U.C.A.1953, § 78_3a.602(7) 
[6| Infants <S=>68.7(2) 
21 lk68.7(2) Most Cited Cases 
Information filed in juvenile court charging juvenile 
with attempted murder did not include charge of 
aggravated assault at the time juvenile was bound 
over to be tried as an adult, as included offenses at 
that point could only be those whose statutory 
elements necessarily were included within the 
elements of attempted murder CCA 1953. ^ 
"'6-5-103, 76-5-201, 78-3a-602(7) 
[7] Infants <§=>68.7(i) 
2 llk68 11).Most Cited Cases 
The term "charges" in Serious Youth Offender Act 
refers to the serious youth offender charges that 
require a juvenile court to bind a minor over to 
district court and does not include other offenses 
arising from the same criminal episode I C A >s 
~*-3d-602(10) 
*589 Joan C Wan and John D O'Connell. Jr. Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L Shurtleff and J Frederic \ oros. Jr. Mlt 
to Orm L S Govt Works 
M P >d ^ 
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 588. ^589) 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges BILLINGS, DAVIS and ORME 
OPINION 
DAVIS, Judge-
^ 1 Joseph Tunzi challenges the district court's 
jurisdiction to enter a judgment of conviction for 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-l03(l)(b) (1999) We 
vacate the district court's judgment of conviction and 
remand to the district court with instructions to 
transfer the case to juvenile court for entry of an 
adjudication ot guilt for third degree felony 
aggravated assault 
BACKGROUND 
<! 2 In the fall of 1998, when Tunzi was seventeen 
years old, he got into a fight with another young man 
The State filed an information in juvenile court 
charging Tunzi with attempted murder After a 
hearing held pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-3a-602 
(1996) (Serious Youth Offender Act), the juvenile 
court bound Tunzi over to district court to be tried as 
an adult. 
<| 3 Following a two day jury trial, the court 
instructed the jury on the elements of attempted 
murder and the lesser included offense of aggravated 
assault. The aggravated assault instruction included 
elements of both the second and third degree felony 
versions of that crime. After deliberating, the jury 
found Tunzi not guilty of attempted murder and guilty 
of aggravated assault. [FN1] However, because the 
aggravated assault instruction contained elements of 
both the second and third degree felony versions of 
aggravated assault, Tunzi moved for a new trial or, in 
the alternative, entry of a conviction for aggravated 
assault as a third degree felony. *590 The State 
conceded that the appropriate remedy for the 
equivocal instruction and general verdict w'as 
conviction for aggravated assault as a third degree 
felony 
FN1 The verdict found Tunzi "guiltv of 
aggravated assault, a lesser included offense 
of the Information ' 
*I 4 After the State conceded that Tunzi should be 
convicted for aggravated assault as a third degree 
felony. Tunzi moved the court to remand his case to 
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the juvenile court Tunzi argued that the district 
court would lose jurisdiction if he was lound guiltv ot 
third degree felony aggravated assault because that 
offense is not one of the serious youth offender 
offenses enumerated in section "8-3a-602( 1) allowing 
bind-over The district court denied Tunzi's motion 
to remand the case to juvenile court and entered a 
judgment of conviction for the third degree telonv 
version of aggravated assault The court then 
sentenced Tunzi to serve an indeterminate term ot 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison [F\2] 
FN2 The court also ordered Tun?! to pav 
restitution to the victim, attorney tees and a 
combined fine and surcharge or S5 'MIO no 
*f 5 Tunzi appealed his conviction arguing that the 
district court erred when it refused to remand his ..ase 
to juvenile court. Tunzi also argued there was 
insufficient evidence to support his conviction tor 
aggravated assault. After filing his notice of appeal 
Tunzi discovered that the videotape and transcript 
from one day of his trial were missing Tunzi then 
moved for summary reversal, and the State conceded 
that reversal was appropriate The court of appeals 
denied Tunzi's motion and remanded the case to the 
trial court to reconstruct the record pursuant to Rule 
I Kg) of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Tunzi 
appealed the court of appeals decision to the I tah 
Supreme Court. On certiorari, the supreme court 
reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case 
to the trial court for a new trial See State \ Tunzi 
2000 UT 38, 998 P 2d 816 The supreme court held 
that reconstruction of the record was inappropriate 
because M[t]he burdens and futility associated with 
reconstructing a record are increased exponential 
when the issue on appeal concerns the sutficiencv ot 
the evidence supporting a conviction ' hi at * 3 
Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme ^ourt 
addressed the merits of Tunzi's first appeal 
1 6 On remand, the State moved to proceed under the 
original information charging Tunzi with attempted 
murder [FN3] However, pursuant to plea 
negotiations, the State amended the original 
information to charge Tunzi with the third degree 
telonv version of aggravated assault Tunzi pleaded 
guilty to this charge, however, he did not renew his 
motion to remand his case to juvenile court In 
accordance with the plea agreement the district court 
again sentenced Tunzi to zero to five vears in -: 
Ltah State Prison However, the court ^ave Tunzi 
credit tor the twenrv-one months he had alreadv 
^er\ed and suspended the remainder ot the sentence 
Copr c West 2002 No Claim to Ong I S Govt Works 
31 P.3d 5>S 
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 588. *5%) 
Tunzi appeals the district court's judgment of 
conviction. 
FN3. We also note that the case proceeded 
under the original case number. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
«| 7 Whether the Serious Youth Offender Act 
required the district court to remand Tunzi's case to 
the juvenile court involves a question of statutory 
construction which "we review for correctness and 
give no deference to the conclusions of the trial 
court." Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14.<! 
IK 1 P.3d528. 
ANAUYSIS 
[1] <1 8 Tunzi asserts, pursuant to the Serious Youth 
Offender Act. the district court lost jurisdiction and 
was required to remand the case to juvenile court 
when the jury acquitted him of the attempted murder 
charge and found him guilty of what was ultimately 
determined to be third degree felony aggravated 
assault. 
11 9 The Serious Youth Offender Act provides the 
procedure by which a juvenile may be "bound over 
and held to answer in the district court in the same 
manner as an adult...." Utah Code Ann. § 
78-3a-602(3)(b) (1996). One of the prerequisites for 
binding a minor over to district court is that the minor 
be charged with one of the specifically enumerated 
offenses listed in the Serious *591 Youth Offender 
Act. See id. § 78-3a-602(l)(a) (listing attempted 
murder and second degree felony aggravated assault 
as charges warranting bind-over). [FN4] However, 
the Serious Youth Offender Act also provides: "The 
juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the 
Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and 
any authority previously exercised over the juvenile 
when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or 
dismissal of the charges in the district court." [FN5] 
Id. § 78-3a- 602(10). 
FN4. The Serious Youth Offender Act also 
provides that, under certain circumstances, 
i minor may be bound over to district court 
even if the minor has not been charged with 
one of the enumerated offenses. However, 
Tunzi was charged with one of the 
enumerated offenses; therefore, we focus 
our analysis on the offenses listed in 
subsection (1 )(a). See id. 
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FN5. Utah Code Ann. $ ~8-3a-l04 i {w» 
enumerates matters over which the juvenile 
court has exclusive jurisdiction. 
[2] <I 10 As the above language clearly indicates, the 
Serious Youth Offender Act defines the jurisdictional 
parameters of both the juvenile court and the district 
court in those instances when a minor is charged with 
one of the offenses listed in section 78-3a-602(l)(a). 
Therefore, the Serious Youth Offender Act provides 
the district court with subject matter jurisdiction over 
minors bound over to that court. [FN6] See Franklin 
Covey Client Sales v. Melvin. 2000 UT App 110.«! 24 
n. 3, 2 P.3d 451 ("Subject matter jurisdiction is the 
authority and competency of the court to decide the 
case...."). Consequently, any jurisdictional defect 
arising from misapplication of the statute cannot be 
waived. See James v. Galetka, 965 P.2d 567. 5"0 
(Utah Ct.App.1998) (stating subject matter 
jurisdiction " 'can neither be waived nor conferred by-
consent of the accused' " (citation omitted)); In re 
E.G.T.. 808 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah Ct.App.1991) 
(stating, "a [subject matter] jurisdictional defect 
cannot be waived"). 
FN6. We also note that the Serious Youth 
Offender Act is contained in Part 6 o( the 
Juvenile Court Act of 1996, which is titled 
Transfer of Jurisdiction. See Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-3a-601 to -603 (1996). 
[3] H 11 Here, the State argues that Tunzi waived his 
right to appeal when he pleaded guilty to third degree 
felony aggravated assault. See id. at 140 (stating that 
"entry of an unconditional guilty plea constituted a 
waiver of the claimed defects in the juvenile court 
certification proceedings"). However, as stated 
above, the Serious Youth Offender Act confers 
subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. 
Therefore, Tunzi did not waive his claim of error 
when he pleaded guilty to the charge of third degree 
felony aggravated assault. Consequently, we address 
the merits of Tunzi's appeal. 
H 12 The State charged Tunzi with attempted murder, 
and the juvenile court bound Tunzi over to district 
court pursuant to the Serious Youth Offender Act. 
Tunzi was then tried in district court where a jury 
acquitted him of attempted murder. Consequently. 
Tunzi was acquitted of the original charge that 
supported the juvenile court's bind-over to district 
court. Further, Tunzi was found guilty of the lesser 
included offense of aggravated assault, and due to the 
ambiguous jury verdict, the court in effect dismissed 
the charge o( second degree felony aggravated 
Copr. C West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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(Cite as: 31 P.3d 588, *591) 
assault. [FN7] 
FN7. The State conceded, and the court 
agreed, that the appropriate treatment o( the 
ambiguous verdict was entry of conviction 
for aggravated assault as a third degree 
felony. Therefore, when the court granted 
Tunzi's motion to impose the third degree 
felony charge, the court's ruling operated as 
a de facto dismissal of the second degree 
aggravated assault charge. 
[4] «[ 13 The State argues that the juvenile court did 
not regain jurisdiction over Tunzi because Tunzi was 
not acquitted of second degree felony aggravated 
assault--an offense allowing bind-over under the 
Serious Youth Offender Act. However, the State 
ignores the language of the Serious Youth Offender 
Act which states that the juvenile court regains 
jurisdiction if "there is an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or dismissal of the charges in the district 
court." Id. § 78-3a-602(l0) (emphasis added). 
Lrpon the finding of not guilty of attempted murder 
and the court's decision to grant Tunzi's motion to 
enter a conviction of third degree felony aggravated 
assault, the juvenile court regained *592 jurisdiction 
over Tunzi because there was "a finding of not guilty 
[and] dismissal of the charges [enumerated in section 
78-3a-602(l) and allowing bind-over to] district 
court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(10) (1996). 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred 
when it denied Tunzi's motion to transfer jurisdiction 
back to the juvenile court prior to entry of his 
conviction. 
*1 14 Finally, the State argues that the district court 
retained jurisdiction over Tunzi because Tunzi was 
convicted of an offense arising out of the same 
criminal episode. In support of its argument, the 
State points to subsection 7 of the Serious Youth 
Offender Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a- 602(7) 
(1996). Subsection 7 provides: 
When a defendant is charged with multiple 
criminal offenses in the same information or 
indictment and is bound over to answer in the 
district court for one or more charges under this 
section, other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent 
misdemeanors or felonies charged against him 
shall be considered together with those charges, 
and where the court finds probable cause to 
believe that those crimes have been committed 
and that the defendant committed them, the 
defendant shall also be bound over to the district 
court to answer for those charges. 
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Id. (emphasis added). The State reasons that the 
use of the term "charges" in subsection 10 includes 
the serious youth offender charge(s) as well as any 
other charge arising out of the same criminal episode. 
Id. at § 78-3a-602(l0). Consequently, the State 
concludes that there must be an acquittal, finding oi 
not guilty, or dismissal of all offenses charged for the 
juvenile court to regain jurisdiction under subsection 
10. See id. 
*! 15 While subsection 7 allows the district court to 
exercise jurisdiction over other offenses arising out of 
(and after) the violent felony enumerated in section 
78-3a-602(l) and allowing bind-over, the plain 
language of subsection 7 requires that these offenses 
be charged in the same information. See id In 
addition, subsection 7 requires the juvenile court to 
"find [ ] probable cause to believe that those crimes 
have been committed and that the defendant 
committed them...." Id. at § 78-3a-602 (7). 
[5] *1 16 Here, the State charged Tunzi in the same 
information with the single offense of attempted 
murder. The State did not charge Tunzi with 
"multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information^]" and the juvenile court's bind-over did 
not necessarily include a finding of 'probable cause 
to believe that those crimes have been committed and 
that the defendant committed them...." Id at ^ 
78-3a-602(7). Consequently, the third degree felony 
aggravated assault was not an "other offense" under 
subsection 7, and the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to enter a conviction therefor. Id. 
[6] *! 17 Further, even if it is assumed that the 
information effectively charges lesser included 
offenses prior to the requested instructions on such 
offenses, the included offenses at that point can be 
only those "whose statutory elements are necessarily 
included within the statutory elements of the charged 
offense." State v Carnith, 1999 LT 107«! 13. 993 
P 2d 869 (emphasis added). The elements of 
aggravated assault are not necessarily included within 
the statutory elements of attempted murder 
Compare Utah Code Ann. § "6-5-201 (1996) i listing 
elements of criminal homicide) with id. $ "6-5-103 
(listing elements of aggravated assault including 
elements of intentionally causing serious bodily 
injury to another or using a dangerous weapon or 
other means of force likely to produce death or 
venous bodily injury). Therefore, the information 
charging Tunzi with attempted murcier did not include 
the charge o( aggravated assault at the time of the 
hind-over 
Copr. C West 2002 No Claim to Ong I S Govt. Works 
31 P.3d VVN 
(Cite as: 31 P.3d 588. *592) 
[7] «! 18 Finally, we find the State's argument 
unpersuasive because it would be contrary to the 
purposes of the Juvenile Court Act of 1996 to 
interpret the term "charges" in subsection 10 to 
include charges other than those requiring bind-over 
under the Serious Youth Offender Act. [FN8] See 
State v. *593 Soma, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993) (stating "if there is doubt or uncertainty 
as to the meaning or application of the provisions of 
an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its 
entirety, in light of its objective, and to harmonize its 
provisions in accordance with its intent and purpose" 
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
Specifically, it would be unjust and contrary to a 
minor's best interests to require a minor to "answer in 
district court in the same manner as an adult" when 
the minor has not been convicted of any of the violent 
felonies enumerated in the Serious Youth Offender 
Act. [FN9] See In re A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1098 (Utah 
Ct.App.1997) (stating Serious Youth Offender Act 
allows violent juveniles to be held accountable in 
district court to protect "the public from juveniles 
who are just as dangerous as adult criminals"). 
Consequently, we conclude that the Legislature's use 
of the term "charges" in subsection 10, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-3a-602(l0) (1996), refers to the serious 
youth offender charge(s) that require a juvenile court 
to bind a minor over to district court and does not 
include "other offenses arising from the same 
criminal episode." Id. § 78-30-602(7). 
FN8. The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act 
of 1996 is to, among other things, impose 
appropriate sanctions on minors who have 
violated the law and strive to act in the best 
interests of the children in all cases. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-l02(5)(aXg) 
(1996). 
FN9 [Tjhere are critically important 
differences in the treatment of those 
juveniles tried as adults compared to those 
left in the juvenile system. For instance, 
cases tried in the juvenile court are 
considered civil rather than criminal 
proceedings. [See] Utah Code Ann. $ 
78-3a- [117 (Supp.2000) ]. This has 
significant ramifications for an individual's 
future criminal record. Moreover, any 
juvenile committed to a secure facility 
under the direction of the Division of Youth 
Corrections must be released at age twenty-
one. Utah Code Ann. § 62A~7-108(1). 
Therefore, because section [78-3a-602] 
applies only to individuals sixteen years o( 
age or older, a juvenile in the statutory class 
uho is left in the juvenile system races a 
maximum potential sentence ot five vears or 
less. 
The foregoing scenario is a dramatic 
contrast to that facing another juvenile in 
the same statutory class who is charged as 
an adult.... Aside from acquiring a 
permanent criminal record, this juvenile 
faces ... a much greater deprivation o\ 
personal liberty than that risked by his or 
her counterpart who is tried as a juvenile. 
Moreover, rather than facing detention at a 
juvenile facility, these offenders are eligible 
for housing in the state prison or other adult 
facilities. 
State v Mohi, 901 P 2d 991, 998 (Utah 
1995). 
CONCLUSION 
*! 19 Tunzi was found not guilty of attempted murder. 
and the lesser included offense of second degree 
aggravated assault was, in effect, dismissed. 
Although the trial court entered a conviction for third 
degree felony aggravated assault, third degree felony 
aggravated assault is not an offense over which the 
district court may retain jurisdiction over Tunzi. 
Therefore, the juvenile court regained jurisdiction 
over Tunzi pursuant to subsection 10 of the Serious 
Youth Offender Act at the time that Tunzi was 
acquitted of attempted murder and the court 
determined that his conviction should be for third 
degree felony aggravated assault. Accordingly, we 
vacate Tunzi's conviction and remand to the district 
court with instructions to transfer the case to the 
juvenile court for entry of an adjudication of guilt for 
third degree felony aggravated assault. 
«| 20 I CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS. Judge. 
ORME, Judge (concurring): 
•1211 concur in the court's opinion, but must note 
that 1 find the statute to be, if not ambiguous, at least 
perplexing. I believe the main issue presents a much 
closer question than the lead opinion recognizes 
c
 22 My puzzlement concerns subsection 10 oi the 
Serious Youth Offender Act, which states: 
The juvenile court under Section "8-3a-l04 and 
the Division of Youth Corrections regain 
jurisdiction and any authority previously 
exercised over the juvenile when there is an 
acquittal, a finding o( not guilty, or dismissal of 
the charges in the district court. 
Utah Code Ann. § T8-3a-602( 10) (19Q9). The 
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subsection is capable of two interpretations, neither of 
which is very satisfying One view-that offered by 
the State-is that subsection 10 merely recognizes that 
if a *594 juvenile defendant is cleared of any and all 
charges in a proceeding that originated under the 
Serious Youth Offender Act, the juvenile justice 
system may go ahead and deal with unrelated matters 
involving the juvenile The glaring difficulty with this 
interpretation is that this would be exactly the result if 
subsection 10 did not exist In other words, under 
this interpretation subsection 10 merely states the 
obvious and is completely unnecessary Courts are 
understandably reluctant to conclude that legislatures 
would enact into law provisions that do nothing at all 
*1 23 The other view-the one offered by appellant 
and embraced in the lead opinion-is that the balance 
of a proceeding will revert to the juvenile justice 
system once the core charge-and perhaps any other 
charge that passes muster under subsection 7-has 
been resolved, even if the juvenile defendant stands 
convicted in district court Thus, a defendant could 
be properly tried in district court on a Serious Youth 
Offender Act crime He could be acquitted of that 
charge but convicted of a lesser included offense not 
before the district court pursuant to subsection 7 If 
he were acquitted of the core charge, the district court 
in which he was convicted of the lesser offense 
would, at the same instant, lose jurisdiction, and the 
case would revert to the juvenile court. 
*! 24 I am not aware of any explicit mechanism by 
which the juvenile court can take over a district court 
case that has resulted in a conviction, whether by jury 
or bench trial or by plea bargain. If the Legislature 
really meant to require such, I cannot imagine why it 
would not have provided some time frames, specified 
which court would entertain motions for new trial. 
Pa^e " 
[FNI] and made explicit the idea that the juvenile 
court would impose sentence [FN2] In short I have 
a hard time believing the Legislature had in mind that 
part of a district court case-indeed, a district court 
conviction-would revert to the juvenile court for 
further action without saying a little bit more about 
how such an aberrational approach to criminal 
jurisprudence would work in practice 
FN1 As the district court loses jurisdiction 
with the acquittal or dismissal ot the core 
charge, I guess the juvenile court would 
necessarily entertain any motion tor new 
trial concerning conviction on a lesser 
included otfense Such a scenario i> 
problematic The juvenile court would 
have to decide whether tor instance newlv 
discovered evidence would possiblv thange 
the outcome in a case it did not trv 
FN2 The sentencing implications are 
perhaps most troubling 1 he view we adopt 
leaves a judge who did not preside over the 
case imposing sentence 
<I 25 Basically, then, we must decide whether the 
Legislature, in adopting subsection 10 meant to say 
nothing at all and was just wasting space in the L tah 
Code, or whether it meant to say something but did 
not say it very clearly or completely Obviouslv 
neither outcome is ideal On balance, however I 
believe the second option is more defensible and on 
that basis I concur in the court's opinion In doing 
so, I recognize there is about a fifty percent chance 
we are wrong If we are, with the problem having 
been highlighted by this case, I am confident the 
Legislature will speedily rectify our mistake 
ENDOFDOCLMENT 
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ADDENDUM B 
78-3a-602. Serious youth offender — Procedure. 
(11 Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney 
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by 
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges 
any of the following offenses: 
' a) any felony violation of: 
ii) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ID Subsection 76-5-103(1 )(ai, aggravated assault, involving inten-
tionally causing senous bodily injury to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203. aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(v\) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
Kai; Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
iixj Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or 
<b> an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an 
adult, and the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would have 
been a felony if committed by an adult. 
<2> All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under 
Subsection < 1 > shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
<3> (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsec-
tion 11), the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and 
the burden of proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the 
crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (1Kb), the state shall have 
the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense 
involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
ib) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under 
this subsection, the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and 
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless 
the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an 
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a 
felony if committed by an adult; 
di) that if the offense was committed with one or more other 
persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than 
the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a 
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this subsection as to a 
showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going 
forward and presenting evidence as to the existence of the above condi-
tions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence 
that all the above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its 
findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed 
upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
• 4 * If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but 
that the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to 
bind the defendant over under Subsection 11), the juvenile court judge shall 
order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the 
information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest 
shall issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other 
criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court 
judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, 
Chapter 20, Bail. 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under 
this section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need 
not include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment 
was committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court 
shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consid-
erations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same 
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for 
one or more charges under this section, other offenses ansing from the same 
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged 
against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the 
court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed 
and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound 
over to the district court to answer for those charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court 
under this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand 
jury, is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the distnct court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defen-
dant has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the 
use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of 
the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the district court. 
f 10) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the 
juvenile when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of the 
charges in the district court. 
ADDENDUM C 
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SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER AMENDMENTS 
2002 GENERAL SESSION 
STATE OF UTAH 
Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard 
This act modifies the Judicial Code by providing that certain offenses committed by a minor 
within a secure facility are not subject to district court jurisdiction, and clarifying when 
jurisdiction over a minor is retained under the Serious Youth Offender provisions. This act 
takes effect immediately. 
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows: 
AMENDS: 
78-3a-<>01, as last amended by Chapter 78, Laws of Utah 1998 
78-3a-602, as enacted by Chapter 1 and last amended by Chapter 239, Laws of Utah 1996 
78-3a-603, as last amended by Chapter 365, Laws of Utah 1997 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
Section 1. Section 78-3a-601 is amended to read: 
78-3a-601. Jurisdiction of district court 
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years 
of age or older charged by information or indictment with: 
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult; or 
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor has been 
previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This Subsection (1 Kb) 
shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility. 
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under this 
section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses joined with 
the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same 
criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the 
minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense. 
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which the 
district court takes jurisdiction under [Subsections] Subsection (1) or (2) shall be tried against the 
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defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court having jurisdiction. 
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not 
guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 
and the Division of Youth Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised 
over the minor. 
Section 2. Section 78-3a-602 is amended to read: 
78-3a-602« Serious youth offender - Procedure. 
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging a 
minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the juvenile 
court if the information charges any of the following offenses: 
(a) any felony violation of: 
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson; 
(ii) Subsection 76-5-103(l)(a), aggravated assault, involving intentionally causing serious 
bodily injury to another; 
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnaping; 
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary; 
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery; 
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault; 
(vii) Section 76-10-508, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; 
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or 
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder, or 
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (l)(a) involving the use of a dangerous 
weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been previously 
adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which also would 
have been a felony if committed by an adult. 
(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection (1) 
shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court. 
(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1), the state 
- 2 -
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shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish probable 
cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed and that the 
defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection (l)(b), the state shall have the additional 
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously been 
adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon. 
(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection £3], 
the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district court in the 
same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that all of the following conditions 
exist: 
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the use 
of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult; 
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears to 
have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and 
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or 
premeditated manner. 
(c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection £2} as to a showing of probable 
cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and presenting evidence as to the 
existence of the above conditions. 
(d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that all the above 
conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as 
a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the state has 
not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over under Subsection 
(1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon 
the information as though it were a juvenile petition. 
(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue. The 
defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of 
that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 
- 3 -
S.B. 26 Enrolled Copy 
77, Chapter 20, Bail 
(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section, the 
preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of probable 
cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant committed it, 
but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional 
considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b). 
(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same information 
or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more charges under this 
section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors 
or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court 
finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the defendant 
committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the district court to answer for those 
charges. 
(8) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this section 
or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury, is not entitled to a preliminary 
examination in the district court. 
(9) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has previously 
been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon, or is 16 years 
of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need to be proven at trial in the 
district court. 
(10) If a minor enters a plea to. or is found guilty of. anv of the charges filed or anv other 
offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over the minor 
for all purposes, including sentencing. 
[f*^] £11} The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth 
Corrections regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the juvenile when there 
is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of [the] ail charges in the district court. 
Section 3. Section 78«3a-603 is amended to read: 
78-3a-603. Certification hearings - Juvenile court to hold preliminary hearing --
- 4 -
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Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to district court 
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78-3a-502(3) alleges the 
commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the juvenile court 
shall conduct a preliminary hearing. 
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case 
and the burden of establishing: 
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed 
it; and 
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of the 
minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction. 
(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor or 
of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider, and may 
base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors: 
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires 
isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities; 
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with two or more 
persons under circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under Section 
76-3-203.1 were he an adult; 
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or 
willful manner, 
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being given 
to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418; 
(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by considerations of his home, environment, 
emotional attitude, and pattern of living; 
(0 the record and previous history of the minor; 
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the juvenile 
court; 
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the minor's 
- 5 -
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associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the district court; 
(i) whether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and 
(j) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as 
provided in Section 76-10-505.5. 
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is 
discretionary with the court. 
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical, 
educational, and social history may be considered by the court. 
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the court 
shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear and be subject 
to both direct and cross-examination. 
(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call witnesses, 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by Subsection (3). 
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may enter 
an order: 
(a) certifying that finding; and 
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court. 
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by the 
juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall proceed in 
accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b). 
(9) The provisions of Section 78-3a-l 16, Section 78-3a-913, and other provisions relating 
to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to the extent 
they are pertinent 
(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district court 
is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court. 
(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same right 
to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. 
The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail. 
- 6 -
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(12) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section or when a 
criminal information or indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a committing 
magistrate charging the minor with an offense described in Section 78-3a-602, the jurisdiction of the 
Division of Youth Corrections and die jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor is terminated 
regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any 
subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him, except as provided in Subsection (14). 
(13) [A minor mav be convicted under this section on! If a minor enters a plea to. or is found 
guilty of anv of the charges filed or on any other offense arising out of the same criminal episode* 
the district court retains jurisdiction over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing. 
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78-3a-104 and the Division of Youth Corrections 
regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there is an acquittal, 
a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of [the] all charges in the district court. 
Section 4. Effective date. 
If approved bv two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, this act takes effect upon 
approval bv the governor, or the dav following the constitutional time limit of Utah Constitution 
Article VH Section 8. without the governor's signature, or in the case of a veto, the date of veto 
Qverrifo 
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ADDENDUM D 
UTAH STATE SENATE 
FIFTY FOURTH LEGISLATURE 
2002 GENERAL SESSION 
JANUARY 22. 2002 DAY 2. TAPE 4 
CLERK: Senate Bill 26, Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE: Senator Hillyard, ready to proceed. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: One of the advantages of being here for awhile is you pass a bill 
and you get to come back here the next year and make two amendments to it, and then you 
come back and make four amendments and you end up doing a lot of bills but they all result 
from the work you did on one. 
I don't know how much background I want to give you on the Serious Youth Offender. I 
won't give you a lot but I think you need to know why we're doing what we're doing. The 
Serious Youth Offender was an action we took several years ago with a deep concern about 
some of the youths who were 16 and 17 years old who would normally be so out of control 
that the juvenile court system would have no impact on them whatsoever. We had to have 
a mechanism whereby we could move them into the adult system where the emphasis is more 
on safety and less on rehabilitation because of the limited dollars we have in the juvenile 
court system in which the primary emphasis is on rehabilitation. This bill does two things. 
It actually started out at your request that I combine it in two bills. 
The first part of the bill; under our current law if a juvenile has been in secure confinement 
and then gets out of secure confinement and does something again very serious - zip - they 
go right into the adult system, there's no question about it. Well the problem we found, law 
of unintended consequences, was that these kids talk, and they say "you know, if I get out of 
Decker Lake and I get out in one of these secure places and I assault a guard, then I get 
moved automatically into the adult system even though I have not really served my time 
there, I'm just there right now, have been placed there. And in the adult system I can bail 
out, I can do those things and get out free and so it really is," so they think, "an advantage." 
That's not really the case. We've got some things, but what we do with this bill is simply say 
that if you do that assault while you're at the center it doesn't automatically put you over to 
the adult system. And so that's the first amendment. Youth Corrections have come forward 
to us and said we need to make this amendment because there seems to be some incentive 
on these kids to do an assault because they could move over to the adult system. 
The second part of it was, there was a Supreme Court case that came down on this issue that 
one of these youths again met the criteria, was transferred over because he was charged with 
a very serious felony. When the case concluded, the jury, or the judge, in this case the adult 
system, didn't find him guilty of that felony but found him guilty of a misdemeanor. Now 
the question's got to be , "What do we do with him now?" because he was automatically 
certified over because he was charged with this felony but in fact we found him guilty of a 
misdemeanor. Now it's interesting to read the decision of the court because what they did, 
they sent him back to juvenile court and they said, "We don't know the answer, but we're 
sure if we're wrong the legislature will tell us." Well we're here to tell them that they were 
wrong. We made the decision when we did the Serious Youth Offender that if someone does 
something that serious, they've had that kind of background and that kind of help, the 
decision we made is that the rehabilitative thrust of juvenile court should no longer be 
available to them. They ought to move into the adult system with the emphasis on public 
safety. So what this bill says is, if that happens again, because we've made the decision to 
move them over to the adult system, they'll stay in the adult system and be treated for the 
conviction of the misdemeanor as though they had been an adult and convicted of the same 
misdemeanor and treated there. That's what the bill does. It was approved unanimously by 
the interim committee. Again I think it answers a question the Supreme Court asked us the 
answer. I think we're just keeping in policy what we've decided before. 
PRESIDENT: OK. Any questions for Senator Hillyard on this bill? (silence) Being none, 
I'll call for question on the bill. 
Question is: Shall Senate Bill 26 be read for the third time? Roll call vote. 
(Roll call) 
JANUARY 23. 2002 DAY 3. TAPE 5 
PRESIDENT: We will now go to Senate Bill 26 
CLERK: Senate Bill 26, Serious Youth Offender Amendment, Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT: Senator Hillyard? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I explained this bill yesterday. It basically clarifies two issues with 
Serious Youth Offenders: 
Number one, if they're in a secured facility and attack a guard, they are not automatically 
transferred over to the adult system. 
Number two, if they get transferred over to the adult system and then for some reason they're 
found not guilty of the felony but of the misdemeanor, they still remain in the adult system. 
Once the juvenile system has expended its patience, programs and time on someone so they 
now get transferred over to the adult system, that's where they stay. 
No questions yesterday and it passed unanimously. 
PRESIDENT: Any other questions of Senator Hillyard on this today? (silence) Very good. 
I will now call for question on the bill. 
Question is: Shall Senate Bill 26 be read for the third time, up for final passage? Roll call 
vote. 
(Roll Call) 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
FIFTY FOURTH LEGISLATURE 
JANUARY 30. 2002 DAY 10. TAPE 1 
(Representative Swallow, Senate Bill 26 Pass. 69 yes, 0 no.) 
REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Motion to uncircle Senate Bill 
26, Serious Youth Offender Amendments. 
MR. SPEAKER: Motion is that we uncircle Senate Bill 26, Serious Youth Offender 
Amendments. Discussion of motion? Seeing none, all in favor say aye. 
REPRESENTATIVES: Aye. 
MR. SPEAKER: Opposed say no. Motion passes. Senate Bill 26 will be uncircled. 
Representative Swallow? 
REP. SWALLOW: Thank you Mr. Speaker. Representatives, this bill makes two changes 
to the Serious Youth Offender statutes which permits certain juveniles to be tried in the 
district court. 
The first change deals with when a serious youth is referred to the district court, under the 
laws it currently constituted once a youth has been assigned to a secured facility, if that 
youth thereafter commits a felony, then they become subject to the jurisdiction of the district 
court. Practically speaking what has happened is therefore a youth has committed a crime, 
been sentenced to a secured facility and then has intentionally committed a felony while in 
custody to be able to go to the adult system and take advantage of some of the parole issues 
in the adult system and get an early release. So what this bill does first of all is it states that 
if that felony is committed while they're in custody in the juvenile system that does not 
automatically throw them into the adult system which I think is a wise policy. 
The second change deals with the fact that when a juvenile is charged with a certain type of 
crime they are automatically taken to the district court to be tried as an adult. Later on a 
question arises that if they're not convicted of that crime but they actually are convicted of 
a lesser crime, who has jurisdiction, the adult court (the district court) or the juvenile court? 
This bill clarifies that if they are charged with that adult crime and convicted of a lesser crime 
that district court still retains jurisdiction over the juvenile and that avoids the conflict 
between jurisdiction. With that I'm open to any questions on the bill. 
MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion of Senate Bill 26? Seeing none, Representative Swallow 
for summation. 
REPRESENTATIVE SWALLOW: I'll waive summation. 
MR. SPEAKER: Summation is waived. Voting is open on Senate Bill 26. 
LTAH STATE SENATE 
FEBRUARY 1.2002 DAY 12, TAPE 19 
(Note on tape says "Hillyard motion call of Senate 
pass lift call pass motion to concur") 
PRESIDENT. Well lets go to the concurrent calendar, and we'll go to Senate Bill 26. 
CLERK. Senate Bill 26 is Serious Youth Offender amendment, Senator Hillyard. 
PRESIDENT. Alright. Senator Hillyard? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I have a concern in handling the bill right now because the 
amendment was put in at my request. This is the Senous Youth Offender bill. Youth 
Corrections came to me and said could you please get this effective immediately because of 
the problems we're having with some of the cases of being referred back at district court. 
We are reversing a Utah court case that said "we don't know what the answer is but we're 
going to guess and if we're wrong the legislature will correct us." So we said, "you guessed 
wrong, we're correcting you." But I need to have 20 votes and so I'm looking to make sure 
I have. It passed unanimously here and it passed in the House. The concurrence is that 
we've inserted language making it effective immediately upon two thirds votes and signed 
by the Governor. 
PRESIDENT. Do you want a call of the Senate? 
SENATOR HILLYARD: I'll do a call of the Senate. If I can speak with the Senate to help 
me on that issue because I need to have . . 
PRESIDENT. Do we have five senators standing? (silence) 
We're the call of Senate. 
SENATOR HILLYARD: Thank you. 
